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  Risk management plays an important role in banking industry and there are literally many 
investigations to reduce any risk components in this industry. In this paper, we present a study 
on relationship between tail risk on earning management in Iranian banking industry. In this 
survey, we use two series of data. The first set is associated with yearly information of 19 
different banks over the period 2005-2011 and it contains 114 observations. The second set of 
data includes weekly historical data of eight banks over the same period 2005-2011. In this 
survey, there are four objectives to be investigated. The first hypothesis considers the effects of 
seven independent variables on loan loss allowance as a fraction of total loans. The second 
model is associated with the effects of two independent variables on realized gains and losses 
on securities. The third objective is to study the effects of different independent variables with 
various interruptions on return of banking sectors. Finally, the last model investigates the 
effects of revenue management on tail risk. The result of this survey indicates that there is no 
relationship between tail risk and earning management.         
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1. Introduction 
There have been growing concerns among banks' managers as well as investors on tail risk associated 
with the shares of banking industry (Dimson, 1979; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Demski, 1998; Amihud, 2002; Cornett et al. 2009; Hutton et al., 2009). Ahmed et al. (1999), for 
instance, reexamined capital management, earnings management, and signaling effects for bank loan-
loss provisions. Arya et al. (1998) investigated the relationship between earnings management and the 
revelation principle. Beatty et al. (1995) investigated the impact of taxes, regulatory capital, and 
earnings on managing financial reports of commercial banks. Beatty et al. (2002) investigated the 
impact of earnings management to avoid earnings declines across publicly and privately held banks.    706
Beaver and Engel (1996) studied discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan losses 
and the behavior of security prices. Cohen et al. (2004) studied trends in earnings management and 
informativeness of earnings announcements in the pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods. Cohen et al. 
(2004), in an assignment, investigated trends in earnings management and informativeness of 
earnings announcements in the pre-and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods. Gunther and Moore (2003) 
investigated loss underreporting and the auditing role of bank exams. Healy (1985) studied the effect 
of bonus schemes on the selection on accounting decisions.  
Sloan (1996) investigated whether stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows 
about future earnings. Scholes et al. (1990) studied tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and 
financial reporting strategy for commercial banks. Wahlen (1994) performed an empirical 
investigation on the nature of information in commercial bank loan loss disclosures.  
Houshmand Neghabi and Morshedian Rafiee (2013) investigated the relationship between capital 
structure as dependent variable and seven independent variables including tax rate, firms' growth rate, 
fixed assets, firms' size, operating risk, profitability and industry type. They used the financial 
information of 107 selected companies from 18 different industries listed on Tehran Stock Exchange 
over the period of 2004-2011 covering 40% of total number of companies listed in this stock 
exchange. They used ordinary least square technique to study the relationships. The results of the 
survey indicate that the there was a positive relationship between tax rate and firm's growth rate, and 
capital structure. The result of the survey also indicated there was a negative relationship between 
firm's profitability and capital structure. However, there was no evidence to believe that there was any 
relationship between fixed assets and capital structure.  
Farzinfar  (2013) investigated the relationship between auditor’s opinion and stock return in the 
companies listed at Tehran stock exchange market. In this study, all required data were collected from 
aware shareholders and provided a sampling of 130 questionnaires, the data collected over the period 
2010-2011 using test methods such as computer software, data analysis and statistical methods to 
answer research questions. According to research result through questionnaires and tests, there was a 
significant relationship between stock returns and the auditor's opinion, in fact, for aware 
shareholders of the company the auditor’s opinion had a special message.  
Sohrabi Araghi and Attari (2013) investigated the effect of accruals and operating cash flows in 
decisions of financial statement users in listed companies on Tehran stock exchange, information 
content of operating cash flows and accruals in the connection with decision-making criteria used by 
various groups using financial statement has been examined. They reported that there was a 
significant different between accruals and operating cash flows information content in relation to 
various decision-making criteria but utilizing accruals and operating cash flows supplementary and 
simultaneously in profit frame depending on the selection criteria may or may not be include 
information value-added.      
 
2. The proposed study 
 
The proposed study of this paper considers three models to investigate 12 hypotheses. The first model 
is as follows,  
 
(1) 
 
12 3 4 5 6 7 it tr it it it it it it it it LOSS LNASSET NPL LLR LOANR LOANC LOANA LOANI α ββ β β β β β ε =+ + + + + + + +
 
where  
LOSS: loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans 
LNASSET: the natural log of total assets 
NPL: nonperforming loans (includes loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing interest and 
loans in nonaccrual status) as a percentage of total loans 
LLR: loan loss allowance as a fraction of total loans M. Khodaei Valahzaghard  and A. Samadi / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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LOANR: real estate loans as a fraction of total loans 
LOANC: commercial and industrial loans as a fraction of total loans 
LOANA: agriculture loans as a fraction of total loans 
LOANI= consumer loans as a fraction of total loans 
it it it it GAINS LNASSET UGAINS ε =+ + ,  (2)   
 
where GAINS is realized gains and losses on securities as a fraction of total assets, LNASSET is the 
natural log of total assets and UGAINS is the unrealized gains and losses on securities as a fraction of 
total assets. 
, 1, 2 2, 2 3, 1 4, 1 5, 6, 3, 1 4, 1 3, 2 4, 2 , j t j j tj tj tj tj t j t j tj tj t j t j t r r mr ir mr ir m r i r mr ir mr i α ββ ββ β β ββ ββ ε −− −− ++ ++ =+ + + + + + + + + + +  (3)
where  jt r is the return of bank j in week t,  mt r is the CRSP value-weighted market return and  jt r  the 
stock market return of bank j in week t. In this survey, we use two series of data. The first set is 
associated with yearly information of 19 different banks over the period 2005-2011 and it contains 
114 observations. The second set of data includes weekly historical data of eight banks over the same 
period of 2005-2011. Table 1 shows details of different statistics associated with various variables of 
our study. 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
N  Mean  Std. Deviation  Variance    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Statistic  Statistic  Statistic  Statistic    Statistic  Std. Error  Statistic  Std. Error 
LOSS  114  .107  0.086  .007 0.812 3.587 -0.238   -0.529
LNASSET  114  4.855  0.600  .360    -0.280   -1.237   -0.806   -1.795  
NPL  114  15225.079  19580.417  .3.8E8    1.844   8.143   3.173   7.064   
LLR  114  0.088  0.084  0.007    1.835   8.102   4.892   10.888  
LOANR  114  .141  0.177  0.007    2.880   12.719   9.000   20.032  
LOANC  114  0.316  0.132  0.031 -0.835 -3.685 -0.109    -0.243
LOANA  114  0.083  0.192  0.017    3.289   14.524   9.924   22.089  
LOANI  114  0.135  0.129  0.037    3.132   13.832   15.667   34.873  
GAINS  114  999.202  1459.739  0.017    2.999   3.587   -0.238    -0.529  
UGAINS  114  -150.211  325.372  2.1E6    -4.236   -1.237   -0.806   -1.795  
 
The second set of data considers 2496 weekly observations associated with eight banks and Table 2 
demonstrates details of some basic statistics.   
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for the second series of data 
N  Mean  Std. Deviation  Variance   Skewness  Kurtosis 
Statistic  Statistic  Statistic  Statistic    Statistic  Std. Error  Statistic  Std. Error 
Stock price  1238  .006  0.077  .006    3.398 53.251   48.868   383.226  
rm  2366  11526.540  3065.509  9.39E6    1.715  2.337   34.082   23.233  
rit  2402  119.541  61.238  3750.036   1.472  1.444   29.464   14.461   
  
In this survey, there are four objectives to be investigated. The first hypothesis considers the effects 
of seven independent variables on loan loss allowance as a fraction of total loans. The second model 
is associated with the effects of two independent variables on realized gains and losses on securities. 
The third objective is to study the effects of different independent variables with various interruptions 
on return of banking sectors. Finally, the last model investigates the effects of revenue management 
on tail risk. We have used Hausman Test to find out whether we should use fixed or variable method 
and the test examines the following hypothesis, 
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: Random effects
: Fixed effects
H
H
⎧
⎨
⎩
  
 
 
Table 3 
The results of Chow and Hausman tests 
   Chow  Hausman    
   F-statistics  Sig,  Results  Chi-Square  Error  level   
 
First hypothesis  Pooled  3.043838   0.0134   Unequal intercept     0.000000   1.0000   Random effect 
Panel 5.149200  0.0000  Unequal  slope  26.037212  0.0005  Fixed  effect 
 
Second hypothesis  Pooled  0.968316   0.4407   Equal intercept         Pooled 
Panel 12.724009  0.0000 Unequal slope 36.084180 0.0000  Fixed  effect
 
Third hypothesis 
Pooled  1.121601   0.1203   Equal intercept         Pooled 
Panel 1.991404  0.0533   Equal  slope    Pooled 
 
 
Before we use regression analysis, we need to make sure that the data are normally distributed. The 
results of the implementation of Kolmogorev-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque-bera test are 
summarized in Table 4 as follows, 
 
Table 4 
The results of Kolmogorev-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque- bera tests 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Shapiro-Wilk   Jarque- bera test        
Statistics   Level of significance   Statistics   Level of significance   Statistics   Level of significance   N     
.132   .000   .913   .000   12.57845   0.001856   114    LOSS   
.083   .054   .972   .016   4.674043   0.096615   114   LNASSET    
.231   .000   .750   .000   105.2081   0.000000   114   NPL  
.164   .000   .840   .000   164.0062   0.000000   114   LLR  
.233   .000   .647   .000   501.3565   0.000000   114   LOANR  
.137   .000   .913   .000   13.00211   0.001502   114   LOANC  
.350   .000   .447   .000   623.6314   0.000000   114   LOANA  
.152   .000   .741   .000   1241.196   0.000000   114   LOANI  
.265   .000   .619   .000   614.1940   0.000000   114   GAINS  
.316   .000   .462   .000   2132.012   0.000000   114   UGAINS  
.183   .000   .633   .000   147444.8   0.000000   1180   Rj  
.191   .000   .845   .000   1693.841   0.000000   1180   Rm  
.164   .000   .880   .000   1073.063   0.000000   1180   Rit  
 
Based on the results of three mentioned tests in Table 4, we can conclude that the data are not 
normally distributed. In order to use ordinary least square, we need to make sure there is no auto-
correlation between residuals. Table 5 demonstrates details of our findings, 
Table 5 
The results of statistical tests 
  Linear relationship  Durbin-Watson  Residual test 
Model F-statistics  Sig.  Obtained  Desired  J_B  P-Value 
1  6.007415   0.000007   1.523590   1.5-2.5  278.1319   0.000000  
2 26.86328  0.000000  1.529782  1.5-2.5  167.8885  0.000000  
3  41.56312   0.000000   1.807640 1.5-2.5 8.361318 0.000000  
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 5, all F-statistics are meaningful when the level of 
significance is one percent and we can conclude that there is a linear relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variable. In addition, all Durbin-Watson values are within 
acceptable limit, which means there is no correlation among residuals. Therefore, we can use ordinary 
least square to estimate the model. Finally, we need to make sure there is no correlation between each 
pairs of independent variables and our investigation are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
The summary of correlation test 
Variable LNASSET  NPL  LLR  LOANR  LOANC  LOANA  LOANI  UGAINS  
LN ASSET   1                
NPL  .717  1         
LLR   .384   .231   1            
LOANR  .040  -.142  -.158  1         
LOANC   -.037   .002   .122   -.556   1        
LOANA  .017  .090  -.016  -.110  -.598  1     
LOANI   -.087   -.008   -.190   .014   -.370   -.121   1    
UGAINS  -.375  -.601  -.078  .095  -.081  -.014  .023  1  
 
It is obvious from the results of Table 6 that there is no strong correlation among each pairs of 
statistics and we may use all data for regression model.  
3. The results 
In this section, we present details of our survey on different main hypotheses of the survey. The main 
hypothesis of this survey is associated with the relationship between tail risk on earning management 
in Iranian banking industry, which is as follows, 
Main hypothesis: There is meaningful relationship tail risk and earning management in Iranian 
banking industry.   
0
1
: 0There is no relationship between tail risk and earning management.   
: 0 There is some relationship between tail risk and earning management.
H
H
β
β
= ⎧
⎨ ≠ ⎩
 
Table 7 shows details of our findings of our regression analysis.  
Table 7 
The relationship between tail risk and earning management 
Attributes Non-standard  coefficients  Standard  coefficient  t-student  P-value 
 Slope  Standard  error  Slop     
Intercept  -0.260  0.073 -3.559  0.012
Earning management  0.000038  0.000  0.267  0.678  0.523 
R=.267, R
2=.071, F=.459, P=.523, Std. Error of the Estimate=.129304960  
As we can observe from the results of Table 7, t-student is not statistically significant and we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. There are also eleven sub hypotheses investigated in this survey. 
3.1. The hypotheses associated with loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans 
The first seven hypotheses are associated with Eq. (1) as follows, 
0 1234567
1 1234567
:,,,,,, 0
:,,,,,, 0
H
H
βββββββ
βββββββ
= ⎧
⎨ ≠ ⎩
 
The results of regression analysis are summarized in Table 8 where F-value and Durbin-Watson are 
13.93262 and 1.559447, respectively.  
 
3.1.1 The relationship between LNASSET and LOSS 
The first sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of natural log of total assets with loan loss 
provisions as a fraction of total loans. Based on the results of Table 8, we can conclude that there is a 
meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent. In   710
other words, when all other conditions are remained constant, an increase of one unit in log of total 
assets will yield an increase of 0.065524 in loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans.  
Table 8 
The summary of regression analysis 
Par. Variable  Description Coefficient Std.  error t-student P-value
β0  c  Constant  -0.444697  0.211965  -2.097979  0.0388 
β1  LNASSET  Log of total assets  0.065524  0.029330  2.234045  0.0280 
β2  NPL  Nonperforming loans   -2.02E-07  4.51E-07  -0.447427  0.6557 
β3  LLR  Loan loss allowance  0.318997  0.099529  3.205052  0.0019 
β4  LOANR  Real estate loans   0.167937  0.159997  1.049625  0.2968 
β5  LOANC  Commercial and industrial loans  0.397595  0.260470  1.526451  0.1305 
β6  LOANA  Agriculture loans  0.277374  0.138477  2.003033  0.0483 
Β7 LOANI  Consumer  loans  0.270105  0.133505  2.023186  0.0461 
 
3.1.2 The relationship between NLP and LOSS 
The second sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of nonperforming loans with loan loss 
provisions as a fraction of total loans.  Based on the results of Table 8, we cannot conclude that there 
is any meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five or 
even ten percent. 
3.1.3 The relationship between LLR and LOSS 
The third sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of loan loss allowance with loan loss 
provisions as a fraction of total loans. Based on the results of Table 8, we can conclude that there is a 
meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent. In 
other words, when all other conditions are remained constant, an increase of one unit in log of total 
assets will yield an increase of 0.318997 in loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans.  
3.1.4 The relationship between LOANR and LOSS 
The fourth sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of real estate loans with loan loss 
provisions as a fraction of total loans.  Based on the results of Table 8, we cannot conclude that there 
is any meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five or 
even ten percent. 
3.1.5 The relationship between LOANC and LOSS 
The fifth sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of commercial and industrial loans with 
loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans.  Based on the results of Table 8, we cannot conclude 
that there is any meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is 
five or even ten percent. 
3.1.6 The relationship between LOANA and LOSS 
The sixth sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of agriculture loans with loan loss 
provisions as a fraction of total loans. Based on the results of Table 8, we can conclude that there is a 
meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent. In 
other words, when all other conditions are remained constant, an increase of one unit in agriculture 
loans will yield an increase of 0.277374 in loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans. 
3.1.7 The relationship between LOANI and LOSS 
The seventh sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of consumer loans with loan loss 
provisions as a fraction of total loans. Based on the results of Table 8, we can conclude that there is a M. Khodaei Valahzaghard  and A. Samadi / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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meaningful relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent. In 
other words, when all other conditions are remained constant, an increase of one unit in consumer 
loans will yield an increase of 0.270105 in loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans. 
3.2. The second set of hypotheses 
The second hypothesis of this survey is associated with the relationship of realized gains and losses 
on securities as a fraction of total assets (GAINS) as dependent variable with the natural log of total 
assets (LNASSET) and the unrealized gains and losses on securities as a fraction of total assets 
(UGAINS) as independent variables given in Eq. (2). Table 9 demonstrates the results of our survey, 
Table 9 
The summary of regression analysis for the second model 
Par. Variable  Description Coefficient  Std.  error t-student  P-value 
β0  c  Constant  -4548.629  1273.382   -3.572086    0.0006  
β1  LNASSET  Log of total assets  1162.681  267.9826  4.338643    0.0000  
β2  UGAINS  Unrealized gains and losses  0.647580 0.383653 1.687933 0.0948  
 
3.2.1 The relationship between LNASSET and GAINS 
The first sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship of realized gains and losses on securities 
as a fraction of total assets (GAINS), as dependent variable, with the natural log of total assets 
(LNASSET). Based on the results of Table 9, we can conclude that there is a meaningful relationship 
between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent. In other words, when all 
other conditions are remained constant, an increase of one unit in the natural log of total assets will 
yield an increase of 1162.681 unit in realized gains and losses on securities as a fraction of total 
assets. 
3.2.2 The relationship between UGAINS and GAINS 
The second sub-hypothesis is associated with the relationship between realized gains and losses on 
securities as a fraction of total assets (GAINS), as dependent variable, with the unrealized gains and 
losses (UGAINS). Based on the results of Table 9, we cannot conclude that there is any meaningful 
relationship between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent.  
3.3. The third set of hypotheses 
The third hypothesis of this survey is associated with the relationship of the return of a particular 
bank with the return of market and other banks.  
0 1234567891 0
1 1234567891 0
:,,,,,,,,, 0
:,,,,,,,,, 0
H
H
ββββββββββ
ββββββββββ
= ⎧
⎨ ≠ ⎩
 
Table 10 summarizes the results of our survey when F-value and Durbin-Watson are 41.56312 and 
1.807640, respectively. The regression Eq. (3) has been fitted using the information of eight different 
banks with 52 intervals of data and the results of regression analysis are shown in Table 10. Based on 
the results of Table 10, two hypotheses are investigated.  
3.3.1. The relationship between return of a bank with market return 
Based on the results of Table 10 we can observe that t-student value associated with RM(-1) is 
0.258440, which is not meaningful and we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 10 
The summary of regression analysis for the third model 
Par. Variable  Coefficient  Std.  error  t-student  P-value 
β1 C  -0.0024090  0.0031550  -0.763533  0.4453  
β2  RM(-2)  0.0000039  0.0000023 1.733441 0.0833
β3 RI(-2)  -0.0009160  0.0001480  -6.179626  0.0000  
β4  RM(-1)  0.0000003  0.0000011  0.258440   0.7961  
β5 RI(-1)  -0.0022250 0.0005530 -4.026343 0.0001
β6  RM  -0.0000034  0.0000020  -1.689656   0.0914  
β 7 RI  0.0013930  0.0006430  2.165021  0.0306  
β8  RM(1)  -0.0000010  0.0000009  -1.119178   0.2633  
β9 RI(1)  0.0014680  0.0002030  7.243933  0.0000  
β10  RM(2)  0.0000014  0.0000019  0.717227   0.4734  
 
3.3.2. The relationship between return of a bank with banking industry 
Based on the results of Table 10 we can observe that t-student is not meaningful and we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis when the level of significance is five percent but the hypothesis is rejected when 
the level of significance is ten percent. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between tail risk on earning management in 
Iranian banking industry. There were four objectives to be investigated. The first hypothesis 
considered the effects of seven independent variables on loan loss allowance as a fraction of total 
loans. The second model was associated with the effects of two independent variables on realized 
gains and losses on securities. The third objective was to study the effects of different independent 
variables with various interruptions on return of banking sectors. Finally, the last model investigated 
the effects of revenue management on tail risk. The result of this survey indicates that there was no 
relationship between tail risk and earning management. In summary, Table 11 summarizes details of our 
findings for different components of this survey. 
Table 11 
The summary of testing various hypotheses 
Hypothesis  Independent variable  Dependent variable  H0 H 1 
Main  Tail Risk  Earning management  √  × 
Sub 1  LN ASSET  LOSS  ×  √ 
Sub 2  NPL  LOSS  √  × 
Sub 3  LLR  LOSS  ×  √ 
Sub 4  LOANR  LOSS  √  × 
Sub 4  LOANC  LOSS  √ × 
Sub 5  LOANA  LOSS  ×  √ 
Sub 6  LOANI  LOSS  ×  √ 
Sub 7  LNASSETS  GAINS  ×  √ 
Sub 8  UGAINS  GAINS  √ × 
Sub 9  RM  RI  √  × 
Sub 10  RIT  RI  ×  √ 
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